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In 2008, U.S. policymakers extended the 
maximum duration of unemployment benefits 
from a 26-week limit to 73 weeks (with some 
variation across states) to ameliorate the 
effects of the dramatic increase in unemploy-
ment during the economic crisis. This more 
generous approach to benefits was short-
lived, however, as the temporary Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation program expired 
at the end of 2013. The basic argument for 
not further extending benefits was, as U.S. 
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Abstract
The effect of generous welfare benefits on unemployment is highly contested. The dominant 
perspective contends that benefits provide disincentive to work, whereas others portray 
benefits as job-search subsidies that facilitate better job matches. Despite many studies of 
welfare benefits and unemployment, the literature has neglected how this relationship might 
vary across institutional contexts. This article investigates how unemployment benefits and 
minimum income benefits affect unemployment across levels of the institutional insider/
outsider divide. I analyze the moderating role of the disparity in employment protection for 
holders of permanent and temporary contracts and of the configuration of wage bargaining. 
The analysis combines data from 20 European countries and the United States using the 
European Union Labour Force Survey and the Current Population Survey 1992–2009. I 
use a pseudo-panel approach, including fixed effects for sociodemographic groups within 
countries and interactions between benefits and institutions. The results indicate that 
unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits successfully subsidize job search and 
reduce unemployment in labor markets with a moderate institutional insider/outsider divide. 
However, when there is greater disparity in employment protection and when bargaining 
either combines low unionization with high centralization or high unionization with low 
centralization, generous benefits create a disincentive to work, plausibly because attractive 
job opportunities are scarce.
Keywords
unemployment, welfare state, labor market institutions, institutional interactions, quantitative 
methods
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz 
frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence 
and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
1038  American Sociological Review 82(5) 
Senator Jon Kyl put it in 2010, that generous 
unemployment insurance “doesn’t create new 
jobs. In fact, if anything, continuing to pay 
people unemployment compensation is a dis-
incentive for them to seek new work” (156 
Congressional Record:845). Regarding Sena-
tor Kyl’s point, Card and colleagues (2015) 
argued that although the duration of unem-
ployment spells generally increases with ben-
efit levels, this relationship was particularly 
strong during the crisis. Indeed, many schol-
ars argue that generous and long-running 
welfare benefits act as a disincentive to work 
and thus increase unemployment (e.g., Lalive 
2007; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 2005; 
Meyer 1990; Nickell 1997; for a recent over-
view see Schmieder and von Waechter 2016). 
The notion of a disincentive effect has found 
its way into influential policy recommenda-
tions (OECD 1994, 2006) and has been used 
to justify welfare state retrenchment in a 
number of countries in recent decades (Blyth 
2002).
The disincentive perspective is highly con-
tested. Other researchers have presented funda-
mentally different arguments about the effect of 
welfare benefits on unemployment. Howell and 
Azizoglu (2011), for instance, argue that if ben-
efit generosity increased U.S. unemployment 
during the crisis, it did so by keeping workers 
closely attached to the labor market rather than 
by encouraging them to drop out of the labor 
force. The most prominent theoretical argu-
ment is that instead of functioning as work 
disincentives, benefits financially subsidize the 
job-search process (Gangl 2004, 2006; Pollmann-
Schult and Büchel 2005). According to this 
perspective, welfare benefits for the unem-
ployed relieve the pressure to take on bad jobs 
and enable further education and training 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; 
Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012). Eventually, 
this leads to better job matches and fewer job 
separations, which lowers unemployment in 
the long run (Nelson and Stephens 2012).
The disincentive and job-search-subsidy 
perspectives differ greatly in their understand-
ing of the functions of welfare benefits 
for jobseekers. Both views have been tested in 
a multitude of case studies and macro 
comparative analyses. Some of this work 
offers empirical support for the disincentive 
argument (e.g., Card et al. 2015; Lalive 2007; 
Meyer 1990; Nickell 1997); other work sup-
ports the job-search-subsidy argument (e.g., 
Gangl 2004, 2006; Nelson and Stephens 
2012). Moreover, critical assessments of the 
literature have convincingly called into ques-
tion the existing results, particularly in regard 
to how micro-level mechanisms play out at 
the aggregate level (Atkinson and Mickle-
wright 1991; Avdagic and Salardi 2013; Bac-
caro and Rei 2007; Baker et al. 2005; Howell 
and Rehm 2009; Sjöberg 2000). Ultimately, 
the literature offers quite mixed empirical evi-
dence on the relationship between generous 
welfare benefits and unemployment levels.
This article proposes that the effect of ben-
efits on unemployment differs by institutional 
context. The argument rests on the assumption 
that benefits are part of the interplay of institu-
tions in a complex system (see Amable 2003; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). Draw-
ing on recent research on the growing dispari-
ties between labor market insiders (individuals 
with permanent employment) and outsiders 
(the unemployed and individuals with tempo-
rary employment) (Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; 
Biegert 2014; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier 
and Thelen 2010; Schwander and Häuser-
mann 2013), I highlight the interaction of 
welfare benefits with the institutional divide 
between labor market insiders and outsiders. I 
argue that the institutional insider/outsider 
divide is determined by the disparity between 
employment protection legislation (EPL) for 
individuals on permanent contracts and tem-
porary contracts and by the configuration of 
unionization and centralization in the wage 
bargaining process. By inadvertently influenc-
ing the availability of quality jobs for jobseek-
ers, the degree to which institutions create a 
division between labor market insiders and 
outsiders moderates how generous welfare 
benefits affect unemployment.
The article makes three unique contribu-
tions to the literature. First, by focusing on the 
interaction with the institutional insider/out-
sider divide, it develops theoretical explana-
tions of the relationship between welfare 
Biegert 1039
benefits and labor market outcomes. To test 
these propositions empirically, I combine 
institutional indicators with data on individual 
unemployment from 20 European countries in 
the European Union Labour Force Survey 
(EULFS) and the United States Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS; Flood et al. 2015) for 
1992–2009. I transform the cross-sectional 
time series data into pseudo-panels at the level 
of sociodemographic groups (Deaton 1985; 
Verbeek and Vella 2005). Applying the 
pseudo-panel technique enables the use of 
fixed effects. It thus helps rule out bias due to 
stable differences between sociodemographic 
groups and country-specific factors. As a sec-
ond contribution, the analysis illustrates an 
underutilized method that provides compara-
tive researchers with a novel approach to 
cross-sectional time series data (for other 
recent applications, see Barbieri and Cutuli 
2016; Jæger 2013; Neugebauer 2015). Finally, 
the article extends the scope of previous stud-
ies by analyzing both unemployment benefits 
and minimum income benefits. Most existing 
research focuses on unemployment benefits as 
the sole welfare benefit for the unemployed. 
This neglects the fact that many jobseekers are 
not eligible to receive unemployment insur-
ance (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; Howell 
and Rehm 2009). Minimum income benefits 
include social assistance, housing benefits, 
child support, and other benefits the state pro-
vides to needy people when benefit systems, 
such as unemployment insurance, fail (Nelson 
2010). By analyzing the relationship between 
unemployment and both unemployment ben-
efits and minimum income benefits, the pre-
sent analysis thus delivers more robust 
evidence for the relationship between welfare 
benefits for the unemployed and unemploy-
ment levels.
WelfARe BenefITs As A 
WORK DIsInCenTIve
A large body of research argues that generous 
benefits for jobseekers create a disincentive 
to work, which raises unemployment levels 
(e.g., Card et al. 2015, Lalive 2007; Layard 
et al. 2005; Meyer 1990; Nickell 1997). The 
disincentive perspective is based on the theo-
retical argument that individuals’ reservation 
wages increase when high living standards 
can be achieved without having to work. 
Given that the reservation wage marks the 
line below which individuals will reject job 
offers, higher benefits will result in a larger 
number of jobs not being taken. Therefore, 
the basic expectation is that countries with 
more generous welfare benefits will have 
higher unemployment.
Many quantitative studies have tested the 
disincentive perspective. Micro-level studies 
usually look at policy shifts and explore 
whether they lead to changes in the duration 
of individual unemployment spells (e.g., Card 
et al. 2015; Lalive 2007; van Ours and Vodop-
ivec 2006). Meyer (1990), for instance, 
showed that higher benefits lead to fewer exits 
from unemployment in the United States. 
Strengthening the case for the disincentive 
perspective, he found that exits from unem-
ployment became more frequent just when 
benefits were about to expire. More recently, 
Card and colleagues (2015) used data from 
Missouri and a regression kink design to show 
that the increase in the unemployment dura-
tion due to benefits is markedly larger in 
adverse macro-economic conditions.
To test whether the micro-level mecha-
nism plays out on the aggregate level, macro-
comparative studies use the variation of 
unemployment benefits across countries and 
years to investigate the relationship with 
unemployment rates. In a prominent study, 
Nickell (1997) regressed unemployment rates 
on macro indicators of institutional arrange-
ments. He found a positive association 
between generous benefits and unemploy-
ment in OECD countries. In comparison to 
findings regarding other labor market institu-
tions, such as EPL, unionization, and wage 
bargaining centralization, the detrimental 
effect of unemployment benefits is one of the 
more consistent results in this literature (e.g., 
Layard et al. 2005; OECD 2006).
At first sight, there seems to be empirical 
support for the disincentive perspective. How-
ever, several critical summaries of the litera-
ture argue that the existing evidence is far less 
1040  American Sociological Review 82(5) 
compelling than is widely believed (see Atkin-
son and Micklewright 1991; Avdagic and Sala-
rdi 2013; Baccaro and Rei 2007; Baker et al. 
2005; Howell and Rehm 2009; Sjöberg 2000). 
Although the evidence from micro-level stud-
ies is fairly robust, Howell and Rehm (2009) 
point out that the magnitude of the effects 
found in these studies is typically quite modest 
(see also Atkinson and Micklewright 1991). 
Single-country case studies, moreover, cannot 
account for the labor market and macro-eco-
nomic context, which raises the question of 
confounding macro factors and generalizabil-
ity. Regarding macro-comparative studies, 
Howell and Rehm (2009) problematize the 
comparability of the reported unemployment 
rates used in these studies because national 
definitions of unemployment differ. Further-
more, they criticize the use of gross replace-
ment rates as an indicator for unemployment 
benefit generosity (i.e., the percentage of pre-
vious earnings an average production worker 
receives from insurance before taxes and social 
security contributions).
Studies using net replacement rates (i.e., 
the insurance payments net of taxes and 
social insurance contribution) have found 
only a weak correlation between unemploy-
ment benefits and unemployment rates 
(Howell and Rehm 2009; Sjöberg 2000). 
These limitations are increasingly recognized 
in the literature on the disincentive perspec-
tive (for an overview, see Schmieder and von 
Waechter 2016), but most of the discussion is 
limited to the size of the disincentive effect. 
In summary, the empirical support for the 
disincentive argument is mixed, particularly 
in regard to aggregate unemployment. Addi-
tional mechanisms such as job-search-subsidy 
effects could explain why micro-level disin-
centives do not necessarily translate into 
aggregate unemployment.
WelfARe BenefITs As A 
JOB-seARCh sUBsIDy
In contrast to the disincentive perspective, 
scholars have argued that generous benefits 
could reduce unemployment by serving as a 
job-search subsidy (Gangl 2004, 2006; Nelson 
and Stephens 2012). The basis for this argu-
ment is that employment and unemployment 
are the result of a matching process conducted 
by jobseekers and employers (see Sørensen 
and Kalleberg 1981). In contrast to the ortho-
dox economic perspective, the job match per-
spective highlights that unemployment is not 
primarily caused by poor labor supply. Rather, 
it is the result of the interaction between labor 
supply and labor demand.
In this framework, generous benefits can 
promote employment through two mecha-
nisms. First, benefits allow jobseekers to be 
more selective about job offers by providing 
a buffer in times of joblessness. This 
increases the quality of the ultimate match 
between jobseeker and job, which in turn 
decreases separations and thus boosts 
employment levels (Gangl 2004, 2006; Poll-
mann-Schult and Büchel 2005). Second, 
generous benefits allow workers to invest in 
specific skills, because they provide insur-
ance at times when these workers are seek-
ing jobs. The result is a workforce with 
generally higher and more specific skills, 
again creating higher quality matches for job 
vacancies (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). Hence, 
proponents of the job-search-subsidy per-
spective do not question the potentially 
longer duration of individual unemployment 
spells in a context of high benefits. How-
ever, they reason that generous benefits will 
lead to lower unemployment in the long run 
and on the aggregate level because of better 
job matches and the improved employability 
of jobseekers (see also Morel et al. 2012; 
Wulfgramm and Fervers 2015).
These arguments have been tested in 
micro-level designs and macro-comparative 
research, although not as extensively as the 
disincentive argument. On the micro level, 
studies have focused on the quality of job 
matches after unemployment spells and how 
they vary across different benefit environ-
ments. Pollmann-Schult and Büchel (2005), 
for instance, showed that in Germany, not 
receiving unemployment benefits is associ-
ated with shorter search periods but also with 
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over-education in the next job. Comparing 
Germany and the United States, Gangl (2004) 
found that generous unemployment benefits 
lead to less dramatic losses in post-unemployment 
income. This finding was confirmed in a 
wider comparison involving the United States 
and 12 European countries (Gangl 2006). 
Nelson and Stephens (2012) investigated the 
employment effects of social investment poli-
cies, such as generous initial unemployment 
benefits,1 active labor market policies 
(ALMP), and childcare provision. They con-
ducted an analysis similar to the macro-level 
studies on the disincentive perspective and 
found that unemployment benefits are posi-
tively associated with employment levels and 
job quality.
Beyond the methodological questions dis-
cussed in the previous section, both literatures 
have unfortunately neglected two issues. 
First, neither account has investigated institu-
tional interactions. The literature on national 
production systems argues strongly for the 
existence of interdependencies in the institu-
tional settings of economies (see Amable 
2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). 
The function of an institution such as welfare 
benefits likely depends on the institutional 
context. Institutional interactions have started 
to play a more prominent role in quantitative 
labor market research (e.g., Bassanini and 
Duval 2009; Belot and van Ours 2004; Gangl 
2006; see also Schmieder and von Waechter 
2016). However, to the best of my knowl-
edge, no studies on unemployment have 
explicitly focused on the interaction between 
benefits and their labor market context.
Second, both literatures focus overwhelm-
ingly on unemployment benefits. In most 
countries, social rights to unemployment ben-
efits have to be earned through previous 
employment. As a consequence, only a par-
ticular segment of the unemployed can 
receive benefits through unemployment 
insurance. This selectivity might result in 
biased outcomes because the dependent vari-
able in macro studies is usually the aggregate 
unemployment rate, which includes many 
who are not eligible for unemployment 
benefits. Minimum income benefits—that is, 
means-tested publicly provided benefits—
have rarely been considered in studies on 
benefit effects. Theoretically, they should 
operate via the same mechanisms as unem-
ployment benefits—either by acting as work 
disincentives or by subsidizing job search. 
Because minimum income benefits are more 
widely available to the unemployed popula-
tion, they need to be included in studies of 
social security regimes for unemployed indi-
viduals (Pfeifer 2012).
The InsTITUTIOnAl 
InsIDeR/OUTsIDeR 
DIvIDe AnD WelfARe 
BenefIT effeCTs On 
UneMplOyMenT
The argument in this section rests on the 
assumption that welfare benefits are part of a 
complex institutional system (Amable 2003; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005): “insti-
tutions matter and . . . institutions interact” 
(Belot and van Ours 2004:640). Hence, the 
relationship between benefits and unemploy-
ment plausibly depends on the distribution of 
job opportunities for jobseekers. Job-search 
subsidies will likely be more successful when 
there is a larger pool of quality job opportuni-
ties. Conversely, generous benefits should act 
as a stronger disincentive to jobseekers in 
contexts with fewer good job opportunities. 
Recent research that describes a growing gap 
between labor market insiders and outsiders 
indicates that the institutional configuration 
of the labor market affects the distribution of 
job opportunities.
Institutions and the Divide between 
Insiders and Outsiders
With the growing attention to rising economic 
inequality in rich democracies, there has been 
a renewed interest in the notion of labor mar-
ket insiders and outsiders. Building from clas-
sic theories of insiders and outsiders and dual 
or segmented labor markets (see Doeringer 
1042  American Sociological Review 82(5) 
and Piore 1971; Kalleberg, Wallace, and 
Althauser 1981; Lindbeck and Snower 1988), 
European scholars have described a process 
of labor market dualization between individu-
als with permanent employment (insiders) 
and those without it (outsiders), that is, the 
unemployed and individuals in temporary 
jobs, who have a higher propensity of becom-
ing unemployed (Emmenegger et al. 2012; 
Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2005, 2014).2 
This recent literature rests on the assumption 
that insiders are in a powerful bargaining 
position because the replacement of workers 
has transaction costs for employers. There-
fore, insiders can achieve their goals in a 
variety of ways, be it through cross-class 
coalitions with employers, union representa-
tion, or social democratic parties (see Davidsson 
and Emmenegger 2013; Goldthorpe 1984; 
Rueda 2005). This, the dualization literature 
argues, disadvantages outsiders.
Although insiders have an advantageous 
bargaining position in every economy, the 
dualization literature argues that the gap 
between insiders and outsiders can be wid-
ened by labor market institutions. The setup 
of institutions such as EPL and the wage bar-
gaining process determine the positional 
advantage of individuals in jobs at the core of 
the labor market (Emmenegger et al. 2012; 
Palier and Thelen 2010; Thelen 2014). Tradi-
tionally, the literature has emphasized the 
benefits of regulation and coordination, for 
instance, in regard to wage inequality (e.g., 
Brady, Baker, and Finnigan 2013; Jacobs and 
Myers 2014). By contrast, the dualization lit-
erature points to configurations in which reg-
ulating institutions have unintended effects 
on inequality (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier 
and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2005, 2014). Thelen 
(2014) cautions researchers not to conflate 
coordinated capitalism with egalitarian capi-
talism. The unintended consequence of insti-
tutionalized advantages for labor market 
insiders is that it increases the barriers that 
jobseekers have to overcome to become insid-
ers (Biegert 2014; Fervers and Schwander 
2015). Unlike orthodox economics, however, 
the dualization literature does not claim that 
regulating institutions have effects on overall 
unemployment. Instead, it argues that the 
institutionalized advantages enjoyed by insid-
ers may affect the distribution of jobs.
The Institutional Insider/Outsider 
Divide, Welfare Benefits, and 
Unemployment
The divide between labor market insiders and 
outsiders is relevant to the study of how ben-
efits affect unemployment for two reasons. 
First, it is the unemployed, and thus outsiders, 
who receive unemployment benefits or mini-
mum income benefits. Second, the insider/
outsider divide affects the availability of 
higher quality jobs. In a context of a strong 
insider/outsider divide, employed insiders 
remain in their positions and employers are 
more selective, which leads to fewer and 
worse job offers for outsiders. Here, generous 
benefits create a disincentive to job search 
because quality job offers are scarce, whereas 
low benefits may force jobseekers to take on 
jobs they would otherwise decline. By con-
trast, a labor market with a moderate insider/
outsider divide will yield better job opportu-
nities for jobseekers. In this instance, gener-
ous benefits might lower unemployment 
because improved job-search and job-matching 
processes can help jobseekers avoid bad jobs.
Two sets of labor market institutions are 
most likely to determine the insider/outsider 
divide: (1) EPL for permanent and temporary 
contracts, and (2) the configuration of the 
wage bargaining process in terms of unioni-
zation and centralization (see Emmenegger 
et al. 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 
2005; Thelen 2014). First, EPL determines 
how difficult it is to hire and fire employees, 
which reduces the flow in and out of the labor 
market. EPL thus stabilizes the positions of 
insiders (Barbieri 2009; Gangl 2003; Gebel 
and Giesecke 2011). If letting people go in 
economic downturns is impeded by strict 
EPL, employers are less likely to offer insider 
positions to jobseekers. This may be exacer-
bated if employers can easily offer temporary 
instead of permanent contracts (Eichhorst and 
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Marx 2011; Palier and Thelen 2010). If tem-
porary contracts are less protected than per-
manent contracts, employers are more likely 
to offer temporary jobs to jobseekers, and less 
likely to convert temporary jobs into perma-
nent positions. This increases the number of 
job separations and reduces the number of 
attractive job opportunities (Barbieri and 
Cutuli 2016; Bentolila et al. 2012; Gebel and 
Giesecke 2016; Noelke 2016). The disparity 
between EPL for permanent contracts and 
temporary contracts will thus increase the 
insider/outsider divide and reduce job oppor-
tunities for jobseekers.
Second, unionization and centralization 
may shape the wage bargaining process to the 
detriment of outsiders. Higher levels of 
unionization increase unions’ bargaining 
power, which results in less wage inequality, 
better working conditions, and stronger wage 
growth for the employed (Brady et al. 2013; 
Freeman and Medoff 1984; Rueda and Pon-
tusson 2000; Western and Rosenfeld 2011). 
Because their membership consists primarily 
of permanent workers, unions are often 
thought to represent insider interests (Lind-
beck and Snower 1988). In addition, increas-
ing wages and secure positions for the 
employed might make employers reluctant to 
hire. If so, jobseekers will be more likely to 
receive offers for atypical jobs, if any. In 
addition to unionization, wage bargaining 
centralization is important in the bargaining 
process (Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 
2005). Centralization refers to the level at 
which bargaining takes place and the degree 
to which unions are able to coordinate their 
goals. Centralized bargaining might help 
unions achieve better outcomes for their 
members, which, in line with the previous 
argument, could come at the detriment of 
outsiders. Unionization and centralization 
could thus increase the insider/outsider 
divide, which would negatively affect job 
opportunities for jobseekers.
Hypothesis 1 (regulation): The effect of increas-
ing unemployment benefits and minimum 
income benefits on unemployment varies 
with the disparity in EPL for permanent and 
temporary contracts, unionization, and wage 
bargaining centralization. Benefits increase 
unemployment in contexts with a larger EPL 
disparity, higher unionization, and higher 
centralization. Benefits reduce unemploy-
ment in contexts with a smaller EPL dispar-
ity, lower unionization, and lower central-
ization.
Hypothesis 1 is called the regulation 
hypothesis because it posits that the insider/
outsider divide is determined on a single 
dimension between a flexible and a regulated 
labor market. Yet, there is reason to doubt that 
labor market institutions have a uniform 
impact on the insider/outsider divide. When 
describing institutional regimes and their 
dualization tendencies, researchers have 
found large insider/outsider divides in Conti-
nental European and Mediterranean coun-
tries. Liberal and Nordic countries show 
lower levels of dualization (Häusermann and 
Schwander 2012; Thelen 2014). The assump-
tion that higher levels of regulation necessar-
ily lead to a greater insider/outsider divide is 
thus at odds with the high levels of unioniza-
tion and wage bargaining centralization in 
Nordic countries. Hence, the complementar-
ity of institutional arrangements is essential. 
When centralized wage bargaining is in place, 
strong unions have an incentive to pursue 
moderate wage growth that benefits the whole 
economy, because detrimental outcomes can-
not be externalized (Calmfors and Driffill 
1988). Thus, strong unions cooperate with 
employers and the government to achieve a 
beneficial bargaining outcome (Thelen 2014; 
Wright 2000). This results in moderate wage 
increases and better job opportunities for job-
seekers (Hicks and Kenworthy 1998; Streeck 
1992; Western 1998).3 By contrast, some 
Continental European countries, such as Ger-
many, are less unionized. In such cases, 
unions seek bargaining outcomes tailored to 
their specific clientele (Eichhorst and Marx 
2011; Palier and Thelen 2010).4 They pursue 
maximum wage increases, which are less 
considerate of the greater economy but still 
have widespread influence because of 
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relatively high levels of centralization and 
coverage. The outcome is beneficial for insid-
ers but leaves outsiders with lower chances of 
quality employment. Accordingly, a regulated 
labor market regime may lead to either seg-
mented or solidaristic coordination depending 
on the configuration of its institutional com-
ponents (Thelen 2004).
Hypothesis 2 (configuration): The effect of in-
creasing unemployment benefits and mini-
mum income benefits on unemployment varies 
with the configuration of the wage bargaining 
process. Benefits increase unemployment in 
contexts of lower unionization and higher cen-
tralization and vice versa. Benefits reduce un-
employment in contexts of high unionization 
and high centralization and contexts of low 
unionization and low centralization.
ANALYTIC APPROACH
The analysis aims to estimate how the relation-
ship between benefits and unemployment var-
ies by the level of the institutional insider/
outsider divide. To this end, I combine the time 
series of country-level institutional indicators 
with data on individual unemployment from 20 
European countries and the United States from 
1992 to 2009.5 The use of cross-national data 
over a long period of time maximizes variation 
in institutional arrangements. The multilevel 
structure of the data overcomes limitations of 
prior studies, which often operated exclusively 
at the macro level (e.g., Layard et al. 2005; 
Nelson and Stephens 2012; Nickell 1997; 
OECD 2006). I transform the repeated cross-
sectional data from the EULFS and CPS into 
pseudo-panels to estimate fixed-effects models 
(Deaton 1985). The term pseudo-panels refers 
to a technique to transform repeated cross-sec-
tional data on the individual level into synthetic 
panel observations on the level of social groups; 
this enables the use of panel regression tech-
niques in the absence of real individual-level 
panel data. Because the analytic approach is 
intertwined with the construction of the dataset, 
I first explain pseudo-panels in more detail and 
how I use them in fixed-effects panel regres-
sion models.
The pseudo-panel technique is relatively 
uncommon in sociological research (but see 
Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; Jæger 2013; Neu-
gebauer 2015). Pseudo-panels allow research-
ers to estimate panel data models on the basis 
of repeated cross-sections. In a seminal arti-
cle, Deaton (1985) proposed following 
cohorts and estimating cohort fixed effects 
from repeated cross-sectional data. The 
researcher can define cohorts by any number 
of time-constant individual characteristics. 
The idea is that after grouping all individuals 
who share the same individual characteristics 
into cohorts, researchers can treat the group 
means within these cohorts as panel observa-
tions. When following the cohorts, scholars 
observe new samples of individuals every 
year. At the group level, however, individuals 
can be considered comparable over the years 
as long as the repeated cross-sections are rep-
resentative. This study uses country-specific 
birth cohort, sex, and education groups as the 
units of analysis. The dependent variable is 
the mean value of unemployment within these 
groups, that is, their unemployment rate. The 
analysis thus operates on the meso level of 
the groups. Instead of correlating institutional 
indicators with country-level unemployment 
rates, I examine the relationship between ben-
efits and the employment performance of 
sociodemographic groups, using individual-
level information to model the group mean.
The analysis uses the panel data structure 
in fixed-effects panel regression models (Alli-
son 2009). Fixed-effects models use repeated 
observations of the unit of analysis to decom-
pose the error term of a linear regression 
model into a time-constant error term ϑi  and 
a time-varying error term εit. Formally, the 
models can be expressed as follows:
Y c X P X P
Z
it i x it P it xP it it
Z it i it
= + + +
+ + +
β β β
β ϑ ε
where Yit is the unemployment rate of socio-
demographic group i in year t. On the right-
hand side ci is the time-constant cohort-specific 
intercept. βxpXit refers to the welfare benefits, 
that is, unemployment benefits and minimum 
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income benefits. βpPit signifies the institu-
tional insider/outsider divide. βxpXitPit repre-
sents the interaction term between benefits 
and the institutional insider/outsider divide. I 
test the regulation hypothesis by using two-
way interactions between the benefits and the 
EPL ratio, unionization, and wage bargaining 
centralization. I test the configuration hypoth-
esis with three-way interactions, in which the 
interaction between benefits and unionization 
is further interacted with centralization. βZZit 
denotes various time-varying control variables 
(see below). ϑi  and εit are the time-constant 
and time-varying component of the error term.
The fixed-effects transformation subtracts 
the unit-specific mean of each variable from 
its value in each time period. The equation 
estimated via the fixed-effects models is the 
following:
( ) ( )
( )
Y Y X X P P
X P X P Z Z
it i x it i P it i
xP it it i i Z it i
− = − + −( )
+ −( ) + −
β β
β β +ε it
The transformation eliminates the time-con-
stant group-level difference in unemployment 
ci and the time-constant error term  ϑi . As a 
result, coefficients are estimated using within-
subject variation alone, which rules out bias 
due to time-invariant unobservables.6 The 
cohort panels in this study are determined by 
the country of residence, birth year, sex, and 
education. Thus, the fixed effects account for 
all time-constant unobserved confounders on 
the level of these groups. The inclusion of 
fixed effects on the meso level of synthetic 
cohorts is the key advantage over the more 
frequently applied two-way fixed-effects 
models, which use individual-level data in a 
cross-national setting and include fixed 
effects for countries and time (e.g., Brady et al. 
2013). The pseudo-panel fixed effects account 
for more fine-grained unobserved time-con-
stant heterogeneity than do country-level 
fixed effects. The technique thus offers an 
invaluable advantage in light of the number 
of potential confounders (Allison 2009). For 
instance, this differences out labor market 
structures, culture, work ethic, and the 
specific advantages of education, age, or sex 
groups. In addition, the models use panel robust 
standard errors, which are consistent in case of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.7
In addition to enabling fixed-effects 
regression, a pseudo-panel approach with 
cross-national comparative multilevel data 
provides a number of advantages over pre-
vious studies. First, unlike country case 
studies, this analysis models the macro con-
text of benefits and the heterogeneous 
effects of benefits across different institu-
tional settings. Second, the individual-level 
information on labor market status is cross-
nationally comparable. Previous macro 
comparative studies relied on nationally 
reported unemployment rates. Because 
national definitions of unemployment differ, 
comparing reported unemployment rates is 
problematic (Howell and Rehm 2009). This 
is not an issue for the present study because 
the unemployment rates for the cohorts are 
based on micro-level information.8 Third, 
the multilevel structure of the data allows 
for adjustment for compositional heteroge-
neity. Previous research shows that macro-
level institutions can have idiosyncratic 
effects on unemployment in different age, 
sex, and education groups (Bertola, Blau, 
and Kahn 2007). In contrast to macro-level 
studies, the meso-level data make it possible 
to adjust for compositional heterogeneity in 
terms of country-specific birth cohort, sex, 
and education groups.9
Of course, pseudo-panels are not prefera-
ble over individual-level panel data. One cen-
tral assumption of the present models is that 
the effect of benefits is not systematically 
biased within the country-specific birth 
cohort, sex, and education groups. However, 
in the absence of long-running cross-national 
panel data, constructing pseudo-panels from 
the repeated cross-sections is arguably a next-
best solution. The representative nature of the 
cross-sections could even lead to advantages 
compared to individual panel data, because 
these data are not subject to panel attrition 
and nonresponse as sources of bias (Deaton 
1985; Verbeek and Vella 2005).
1046  American Sociological Review 82(5) 
DATA
The analysis uses data on all working-age indi-
viduals (age 15 to 64) from the EULFS for 20 
European countries and the CPS for the United 
Sates covering 1992 to 2009. Both the EULFS 
and the CPS provide large-scaled, standard-
ized, and representative repeated cross- 
sectional information on individuals in private 
households with a special focus on their work-
ing life. Because I only use basic variables on 
labor market status, birth year, sex, education, 
and marital status, the two datasets are compa-
rable (for other work combing the two data-
sets, see Hipp and Leuze 2015). The 
combination of the datasets offers the singular 
opportunity to analyze the labor markets of 
Europe and the United States over a long time 
period using annual micro-level data. The 
analysis starts in 1992 because the EULFS did 
not collect information on education prior to 
that year. Macro-level institutional indicators 
are merged with the micro data. The full set of 
macro-level variables is available until 2009, 
which is the upper limit for the observation 
period. Before transforming the data into 
pseudo-panels, the full dataset comprises 
almost 20 million cases, with yearly case num-
bers ranging from about 8,500 in Denmark in 
2000 to about 270,000 for Italy in 2005.
Panel Construction and Dependent 
Variable
The cohort panels are based on information on 
country of residence, sex, birth cohort, and 
education. To construct the sociodemographic 
groups, the individuals are first sorted accord-
ing to their 21 different countries of residence. 
Then they are grouped according to their sex. 
The sample is split into 13 five-year birth 
cohorts spanning birth years from 1928 to 
1994.10 Finally, individuals are grouped 
according to three educational levels follow-
ing the 1997 version of the International Stan-
dard Classification of Education (ISCED): 
low education includes respondents with 
lower secondary education or less (ISCED0-
2), medium education contains upper- and 
post-secondary education (ISCED3-4), and 
high education represents persons with a ter-
tiary education (ISCED5-6). Hence, I sort 
individuals from 21 countries, 2 sexes, 13 
birth cohorts, and 3 educational levels into 
1,638 units of observation. Because some 
countries entered the EULFS at a later time 
point or missed years, some birth cohorts are 
not part of the sample, which leaves the actual 
number of units at 1,579.11 The units of obser-
vation are followed up to 18 years, yielding a 
total case number of 18,266.
The dependent variable is labor market sta-
tus (1 = unemployed, 0 = employed). The sur-
veys follow the definition of the ILO (1982), 
which considers people unemployed if they do 
not have a job, if they have actively looked for 
work in the past four weeks, and if they are cur-
rently available for work. Individuals are 
deemed employed if they had worked at least 
one hour during the previous week.12 Members 
of the country-specific sociodemographic 
groups are collapsed into one observation. 
Therefore, individual-level variables are aggre-
gated at the group mean. Consequently, the 
dependent variable is the sociodemographic 
groups’ unemployment rate.13 When construct-
ing the cohorts, yearly cohort-cells have to be 
of reasonable size so that the unemployment 
rate can be estimated robustly.14 In the present 
dataset, the cohort-cells have 16,500 members 
on average, which should provide for reliable 
measurement. However, cohort-cell case num-
bers vary widely. To tackle possible measure-
ment error in the dependent variable, the models 
weight the cohort-cells by the square root of the 
number of observations (Neugebauer 2015). 
This gives more weight to observations whose 
measurement of the unemployment rate is more 
robust.15
Explanatory Variables
The main explanatory variables are country-
level institutions. I use net replacement rates 
to indicate the generosity of unemployment 
benefits. Net replacement rates are the per-
centage of one’s former income received by 
an average production worker from unem-
ployment insurance net of taxes and social 
security contributions. Van Vliet and 
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Caminada (2012) provide net replacement 
rates for singles and one-earner families with 
two children that focus on the replacement 
rate in the initial phase of unemployment. To 
take into account different family situations, I 
use the average of the two indicators.16
Nelson (2010) collects information on the 
absolute amounts of minimum income bene-
fits. The main component of the indicator is 
social assistance. Housing supplements, child 
support, and other benefits are added as long 
as they are not deducted from social assis-
tance. I use the average absolute payments 
from several household constellations to con-
struct a ratio that divides payments by the 
average wage. The indicator thus captures the 
economic support that minimum income ben-
efit schemes provide as a percentage of the 
average wage. Minimum income benefits do 
not just serve as an alternative measure of 
unemployment benefits. The correlation of 
the two benefit schemes was rather low (.31 
in the dataset used here).
I use three indicators to measure the institu-
tional insider/outsider divide on the labor mar-
ket. The OECD provides time series for the 
employment protection of individuals on per-
manent and temporary contracts, which quanti-
fies the costs and procedures involved with 
dismissal (range 0 to 6) (Venn 2009). To capture 
the disparity in protection for workers in differ-
ent contract types, I calculate the EPL ratio 
between the two indicators.17 Unionization, also 
provided by the OECD, captures the organiza-
tional power of unions as the percentage of 
salary- and wage-earners who are union mem-
bers. To measure the centralization of the wage 
bargaining process, I use an indicator developed 
by Iversen (1999) and extended by Visser 
(2013). The indicator measures the degree of 
coordination and centralization by combining 
the level of bargaining and union concentration 
at the respective levels (range 0 to 1).18
Controls
Following previous studies, the analysis 
includes a set of macro-level controls that 
might vary with time and were thus not 
accounted for by the fixed effects (see Layard 
et al. 2005; Nelson and Stephens 2012; Nick-
ell 1997; OECD 2006). An important dimen-
sion of the wage bargaining process is how 
many workers are actually covered by its 
outcome. I use Visser’s (2013) adjusted cov-
erage indicator to model the percentage of 
workers who are covered by wage bargaining 
agreements.19, 20, 21 Welfare states try to “acti-
vate” unemployed citizens via active labor 
market policies (ALMP), such as labor mar-
ket retraining, job-search assistance, direct 
job creation, and employment subsidies 
(Bonoli 2010). The extent to which a country 
invests in ALMP is measured as public expen-
ditures relative to the GDP. To consider busi-
ness cycles, this indicator is divided by the 
unemployment rate. Labor taxes affect labor 
demand and supply because they increase 
labor costs for employers yet also lower 
employees’ net earnings (Nickell 1997). The 
OECD calculates the labor tax wedge for a 
single-earner couple with two children and an 
average income. The tax wedge is the sum of 
personal income tax and social security con-
tributions as a percentage of total income. 
Childcare policies affect the job opportunities 
of parents who want to work (Gornick, Mey-
ers, and Ross 1997). A country’s dedication to 
publicly provided childcare is measured via 
the total public expenditure on childcare as a 
percentage of the GDP. Finally, I use the 
OECD’s output gap as an indicator of national 
business cycles (Bassanini and Duval 2009). 
The output gap measures the distance between 
the trend-based prediction of a country’s GDP 
and actual outcome. Table A1 in the online 
supplement summarizes the macro-level indi-
cators by country. Because the multivariate 
analysis is based on within-country variation, 
the table provides the average value of the 
respective indicator by country (x–), the 
within-country standard deviations (w-sd), 
and the number of years in which the indica-
tor changed compared to the previous year 
(N Δ). Because the multivariate analysis used 
standardized indicators to facilitate the com-
parison of effect sizes, the table also shows 
the overall within standard deviation to pro-
vide substantive meaning for the interpreta-
tion of the coefficients.
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In addition to the institutional and macro-
economic indicators, all models include dum-
mies for the survey waves to account for 
economic shocks and trends that affect all 
countries. This makes it possible to assess the 
impact of institutional changes against a com-
mon trend. Finally, the household context is 
strongly associated with individual unem-
ployment (DiPrete and McManus 2000). In 
the absence of an ideal measure for the typical 
household composition in the sociodemo-
graphic groups, the models include marital 
status, operationalized as the average rate of 
married individuals within the respective 
groups.
RESULTS
Descriptives
Figures 1 and 2 plot the change in unemploy-
ment rates (provided by the OECD) against the 
change in the level of unemployment benefits 
and minimum income benefits between 1992 
and 2009.22 Panel A in the two figures shows 
the overall bivariate association between 
changes in benefits and unemployment in the 
21 countries. To see whether there is descrip-
tive evidence for a moderating impact of the 
institutional insider/outsider divide, Panel B 
groups countries into Continental/Mediterra-
nean, Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, and Eastern Euro-
pean clusters. The existing literature sees a 
large insider/outsider divide in Continental/
Mediterranean countries and a smaller divide 
in Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries (Häuser-
mann and Schwander 2012; Thelen 2014). 
Eastern European countries have so far not 
been included in such typologies.
Figure 1 shows that, comparing 1992 and 
2009, there is a negative bivariate association 
between changes in unemployment benefits 
and changes in the unemployment rate (Panel 
A). Some countries, such as Italy, Finland, 
Denmark, and Ireland, managed to lower 
unemployment by almost 4 percentage points. 
On the other hand, unemployment in Sweden, 
Portugal, and the Czech Republic increased 
Figure 1. Changes in Unemployment Rates and Unemployment Benefits from 1992 to 2009 
in 21 Countries
Note: Change scores for unemployment and unemployment benefits computed as differences between 
1992 and 2009 (due to missing data, first observation is 1994 for SK and CZ, 1995 for HU, 1996 for PT, 
2000 for EE, and 2002 for SI).
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by more than 2 percentage points in the same 
period.23 Changes in the level of unemploy-
ment benefits range from reductions of around 
20 percentage points in Sweden and Hungary 
to increases of 20 percentage points in Esto-
nia and almost 40 percentage points in Italy. 
By clustering the countries, I can draw fitted 
lines that indicate potential institutional inter-
actions (Panel B). The bivariate association 
between unemployment benefits and unem-
ployment is negative in all four clusters. 
However, the association is strongest in the 
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries and rather 
weak in Eastern European countries. The 
Continental and Mediterranean countries lie 
between these clusters.
Similarly, Figure 2 displays a negative 
association between changes in minimum 
income benefits and changes in unemploy-
ment (Panel A). The changes in minimum 
income benefits that apply here range from a 
reduction of around 20 percentage points in 
Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to 
increases of about 10 percentage points in 
Italy, Portugal, and Ireland.24 A strong nega-
tive association between changes in minimum 
income benefits and unemployment again 
emerges in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic 
countries (Panel B) when I cluster the coun-
tries and apply fitted lines. The bivariate 
association is still negative in the Continental 
and Mediterranean country cluster and the 
Eastern European country cluster, but it is 
weaker in both cases.
Overall, Figures 1 and 2 lend support to 
the job-search-subsidy perspective. The anal-
ysis also provides some initial indications that 
the relationship between welfare benefits and 
unemployment differs between regime con-
texts. However, it also reveals that a simple 
grouping of countries according to typical 
regime clusters is not sufficient (see also 
Wulfgramm and Fervers 2015). There is 
strong within-cluster variation, which indi-
cates that we need to go beyond the level of 
regimes. Another reason for going beyond 
Figure 2. Changes in Unemployment Rates and Minimum Income Benefits from 1992 to 
2009 in 21 Countries
Note: Change scores for unemployment and unemployment benefits computed as differences between 
1992 and 2009 (due to missing data, first observation is 1994 for SK and CZ, 1995 for HU, 1996 for PT, 
2000 for EE, and 2002 for SI).
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regime clusters is that the static regime typol-
ogies they are based on disregard institutional 
change. Thelen (2014), for instance, points to 
diverging paths regarding dualization in two 
Nordic countries, Sweden and Denmark, and 
two Continental European countries, Ger-
many and the Netherlands. The following 
fixed-effects analyses model distinct institu-
tional interactions that account for changing 
contexts.
Fixed-Effects Analyses
Table 1 summarizes the results of five fixed-
effects regression models of unemployment 
on welfare benefits, institutions determining 
the insider/outsider divide, and control vari-
ables. Model 1 includes all the main effects, 
and Model 2 introduces the two-way interac-
tions between unemployment benefits and the 
EPL ratio, unionization, and centralization. 
Model 3 adds the three-way interaction 
between unemployment benefits, unioniza-
tion, and centralization. Model 4 mirrors 
Model 2 and interacts minimum income ben-
efits with the EPL ratio, unionization, and 
centralization. Finally, Model 5 adds the three-
way interaction between minimum income 
benefits, unionization, and centralization. 
Hence, Models 2 and 4 test the regulation 
hypothesis, and Models 3 and 5 test the con-
figuration hypothesis. I use standardized coef-
ficients, so the main effects show the 
association at the mean of the variable and 
their respective interaction variables. Further-
more, in the models with three-way interac-
tions, the two-way interactions express the 
association at the mean of the components of 
the three-way interaction. The coefficients can 
be interpreted as the change in unemployment 
rates associated with a one standard deviation 
change in the respective variable. The multi-
tude of interaction effects makes it more dif-
ficult to interpret the models; hence, I will 
display the main findings in graphical form.
The baseline model (Model 1) shows a 
statistically significant negative association 
between unemployment benefits and the 
unemployment rates of sociodemographic 
groups (–1.1 percentage points per standard 
deviation). This implies that job-search-sub-
sidy effects might be stronger than disincen-
tives. However, there is no significant 
association between minimum income bene-
fits and unemployment.
Looking at institutions that determine the 
insider/outsider divide, the EPL ratio shows a 
small but significant negative association 
with unemployment (.3 percentage points per 
standard deviation). The comparatively strong 
associations between unemployment and 
unionization and centralization point in oppo-
site directions (around 3 percentage points 
per standard deviation). The negative coeffi-
cient for unionization is not what would be 
predicted by the orthodox view of labor mar-
ket rigidities and their impact on unemploy-
ment. However, given the very mixed 
evidence of this literature, it is not entirely 
unprecedented (e.g., Belot and van Ours 
2004).25 Moreover, as the following models 
will show, it is questionable whether mode-
ling the impact of single institutions can 
clarify how the institutional context might 
influence unemployment. The coefficients of 
the control variables are mostly in line with 
theoretical expectations. Expenditure on 
ALMP is associated with lower unemploy-
ment and so is higher spending on childcare. 
Neither labor taxes nor bargaining coverage 
have significant coefficients. The significant 
negative coefficient of the output gap indi-
cates that positive economic development is 
associated with lower unemployment. Finally, 
there is a strong association between marital 
status and unemployment: the higher the rate 
of married individuals within a sociodemo-
graphic group, the lower its unemployment 
rate. Throughout the different specifications, 
some of the control variables’ coefficients 
change. Because these changes do not 
strongly relate to the study’s central concerns, 
I will focus strictly on the main variables of 
interest and their interactions.
As noted earlier, I compute models that 
introduce interaction terms to test the hypoth-
eses about the moderating effect of the insti-
tutional insider/outsider divide. Models 2 
and 3 focus on unemployment benefits. 
Model 2 includes the two-way interactions of 
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unemployment benefits with the EPL ratio, 
unionization, and wage bargaining centralization. 
The significant coefficients for the interaction 
with the EPL ratio and unionization support 
Table 1. Fixed-Effects Regressions of Unemployment on Welfare Benefits and Their 
Interactions with the Institutional Insider/Outsider Divide
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment Benefits –.011**
(.004)
–.010**
(.003)
–.005
(.003)
–.010**
(.003)
–.008*
(.003)
Unempl. Benefits × EPL Ratio .008***
(.002)
.009***
(.002)
 
Unempl. Benefits × Unionization .010***
(.002)
.015***
(.002)
 
Unempl. Benefits × Centralization .002
(.003)
.006*
(.003)
 
Unempl. Ben. × Union. × Cent. –.021***
(.003)
 
Minimum Income Benefits .003
(.003)
.003
(.003)
.004
(.003)
–.002
(.003)
.007
(.004)
Min. Inc. Ben. × EPL Ratio .010***
(.002)
.006***
(.002)
Min. Inc. Ben. × Unionization .010***
(.003)
.015***
(.003)
Min. Inc. Ben. × Centralization .023***
(.004)
.020***
(.004)
Min. Inc. Ben. × Union. × Cent. –.023***
(.005)
Union. × Centralization –.029***
(.004)
–.021***
(.004)
EPL Ratio –.003*
(.001)
.008***
(.002)
.007***
(.002)
.000
(.001)
–.001
(.001)
Unionization –.032**
(.010)
–.032***
(.009)
–.013
(.009)
–.050***
(.010)
–.045***
(.011)
Centralization .028***
(.005)
.019***
(.005)
.021***
(.005)
.006
(.005)
.017***
(.005)
Coverage –.001
(.006)
.016**
(.006)
.015*
(.006)
.010
(.006)
–.002
(.006)
ALMP –.014***
(.002)
–.016***
(.002)
–.017***
(.002)
–.013***
(.001)
–.012***
(.001)
Labor Taxes .003
(.003)
.003
(.003)
.003
(.003)
.008**
(.003)
.009**
(.003)
Childcare –.009***
(.002)
–.014***
(.002)
–.013***
(.003)
–.012***
(.002)
–.005*
(.002)
Output Gap –.018***
(.001)
–.015***
(.001)
–.014***
(.001)
–.016***
(.001)
–.016***
(.001)
Marital Status –.040***
(.004)
–.040***
(.003)
–.041***
(.003)
–.040***
(.003)
–.041***
(.003)
Wave Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 1,579 1,579 1,579 1,579 1,579
Observations 18,266 18,266 18,266 18,266 18,266
R2 (within) .335 .340 .348 .348 .355
Note: Coefficients and (panel robust standard errors) from OLS fixed-effects regressions. Constants not 
shown.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Unemployment Benefits on Unemployment Rates across 
Levels of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 3 (see Table 1). The range of computed marginal 
effects is determined by empirical levels of EPL, unionization, and centralization.
the regulation hypothesis; they indicate that 
the association between unemployment ben-
efits and unemployment becomes more posi-
tive as the disparity in the EPL ratio and 
unionization increases. In Model 3, the two-
way interaction between unemployment ben-
efits and centralization is also significant and 
positive. However, the three-way interaction 
of unemployment benefits, unionization, and 
centralization is significant and negative. In 
sum with the two-way interactions and the 
main effects, this indicates that the associa-
tion between unemployment benefits and 
unemployment does not rise with unioniza-
tion when centralization is high. Thus, while 
Model 2 lends support to the regulation 
hypothesis, Model 3 indicates that the con-
figuration hypothesis is more precise by 
showing that the moderating effect of the 
wage bargaining process depends on its spe-
cific constellation.
To illustrate these results, Figure 3 dis-
plays the marginal effects of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment rates across the 
levels of the EPL ratio, unionization, and 
wage bargaining centralization based on 
Model 3. The x-axis is restricted to the empir-
ical values of the three institutional arrange-
ments. Figure 3 shows that increasing 
unemployment benefits by one standard devi-
ation is associated with a reduction in unem-
ployment of almost 3 percentage points in a 
context of very low EPL (Panel A). This 
association comes closer to 0 as the EPL ratio 
rises. It only becomes significantly positive 
when the EPL ratio is extremely high; at such 
levels, a one standard deviation increase in 
unemployment benefits is associated with 
about a 1 percentage point increase in unem-
ployment. Panel B shows that unionization 
and centralization are complementary mod-
erators. When centralization is low (defined 
as one standard deviation below the mean), 
lower unionization leads to a more negative 
association between unemployment benefits 
and unemployment (up to around –5 percentage 
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points per standard deviation). In the same 
context, higher unionization leads to a more 
positive association between unemployment 
benefits and unemployment (up to about 6 
percentage points per standard deviation). Yet 
when centralization is high (defined as one 
standard deviation above the mean), unioni-
zation does not moderate the association 
between unemployment benefits and unem-
ployment rates. In such cases, the coefficient 
never significantly differs from 0, indicating 
no association between unemployment bene-
fits and unemployment.
Models 4 and 5 focus on minimum income 
benefits. Model 4 shows significant positive 
coefficients for the interactions between min-
imum income benefits and the EPL ratio, 
unionization, and wage bargaining centraliza-
tion. This supports the regulation hypothesis. 
Yet again, the significant negative coefficient 
for the three-way interaction between mini-
mum income benefits, unionization, and cen-
tralization added in Model 5 confirms that the 
configuration hypothesis is more precise.
Figure 4 displays the marginal effects of 
minimum income benefits across levels of 
EPL ratio, unionization, and centralization 
based on Model 5. The pattern here is similar 
to the pattern for unemployment benefits. As 
the EPL ratio increases, the association 
between minimum income benefits and unem-
ployment goes from being negative to posi-
tive. Whereas minimum income benefits show 
a negative association with unemployment at 
extremely low levels of the EPL ratio, of up to 
about –1.5 percentage points per standard 
deviation, the association is positive at 
extremely high levels of the EPL ratio, at 
around 1.5 percentage points. Again, Panel B 
shows that the moderating influence of union-
ization and centralization depends on the 
respective level of the other institution. The 
association between minimum income bene-
fits and unemployment becomes more posi-
tive for increasing levels of unionization in a 
context of low wage bargaining centralization. 
Here, a low level of unionization leads to a 
negative association of up to –6 percentage 
points, whereas a high level of unionization 
can lead to an association of up to around 7 
percentage points. By contrast, in a context of 
high centralization, the association is initially 
positive (at about 4 percentage points per 
standard deviation) but gets slightly smaller 
and ultimately becomes insignificant as 
unionization rises. The findings for minimum 
income benefits differ from those for unem-
ployment benefits; there is a positive associa-
tion between minimum income benefits and 
unemployment for all but the very highest 
levels of unionization when centralization is 
high. The results still support the configura-
tion hypothesis, because minimum income 
benefits are associated with lower unemploy-
ment when both unionization and centraliza-
tion are high compared to when just one of 
these factors is high. But in absolute terms, 
minimum income benefits are still positively 
associated with unemployment except in 
extremely unionized cases.
In summary, the findings support the prop-
osition that the effect of welfare benefits on 
employment is moderated by the institutional 
insider/outsider divide. Specifically, Models 
2 and 4 show that the association between 
welfare benefits and unemployment gets 
worse as regulation increases, which seem-
ingly confirms the regulation hypothesis. Yet 
in accordance with the configuration hypoth-
esis, Models 3 and 5 qualify these findings. 
The insider/outsider divide does not simply 
increase with higher levels of regulation. 
Instead, the specific constellation of institu-
tions determines the institutional insider/out-
sider divide and thus moderates the association 
between benefits and unemployment.
Stylized Regimes, Country 
Case Examples, and Long-Term 
Associations
To make these results more concrete, I calcu-
late predictive figures of the association 
between the respective benefit and unemploy-
ment for four stylized regime types based on 
Models 3 and 5 (Table 1). The stylized 
regimes are based on configurations of the 
three institutions that determine the insider/
outsider divide: the EPL ratio, unionization, 
and centralization. A “low” value is one 
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standard deviation below the mean. A “high” 
value is one standard deviation above the 
mean. These figures further illustrate the 
main findings and also explore the associa-
tion between a change in welfare benefits and 
the development of unemployment in the 
long-term. They allow me to investigate the 
timing implications of the disincentive per-
spective and the job-search-subsidy perspec-
tive. This is relevant because disincentives to 
work should arise immediately after benefit 
levels increase. By contrast, job-search- 
subsidy effects are long-term in character; 
they are based on the assumption that better 
job matches and the improved employability 
of jobseekers will ultimately lead to lower 
unemployment (Morel et al. 2012; Pollmann-
Schult and Büchel 2005). Figures 5 and 6 
depict results for the stylized regimes and 
lagged models of benefit changes (modeled 
using lagged benefit indicators from 0 to 5 
year lags; full models can be found in Tables 
A2 and A3 in the online supplement). At t = 
0, the figures illustrate Models 3 and 5 in 
Table 1 for the stylized regimes. At t = 1 to 5, 
the figures show the association between a 
change in benefits and a change in unemploy-
ment one to five years onward.26
Figure 5 shows unemployment benefits 
have by far the most negative association 
with unemployment when there is a low level 
of all three institutions that determine the 
insider/outsider divide. However, as the find-
ings for the other regime types show, it is the 
way the regulating institutions are configured 
that determines whether the association 
becomes positive. In a regime with a low EPL 
ratio, in which the wage bargaining process 
combines high unionization with high cen-
tralization, the association is still negative. By 
contrast, there is a positive association 
between unemployment benefits and unem-
ployment in the two regimes that combine a 
high EPL ratio with either low unionization 
and high centralization or high unionization 
and low centralization.
Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Minimum Income Benefits on Unemployment Rates across 
Levels of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 5 (see Table 1). The range of computed marginal 
effects is determined by empirical levels of EPL, unionization, and centralization.
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Figure 6 shows the associations between 
minimum income benefits and unemploy-
ment for the four stylized regimes. The main 
difference between the findings on minimum 
income benefit and those on unemployment 
benefit is that raising minimum income ben-
efits is associated with higher unemployment 
in three of the four stylized regimes instead of 
two. In a regime with a low EPL ratio, high 
unionization, and high centralization, there is 
a lower positive association between mini-
mum income benefits and unemployment 
than is found in regimes with either high 
unionization and low centralization or low 
unionization and high centralization. Yet, as 
discussed when presenting Figure 4, the asso-
ciation does not become negative.27
In the stylized regimes, the association 
between benefits and unemployment differs 
strongly according to the configuration of labor 
market institutions and the extent to which they 
divide insiders and outsiders. Can we observe 
these patterns in real-typical country cases?
The most prominent country with a low 
level of unionization and an above-average 
level of centralization is Germany. After 
experiencing historically high levels of unem-
ployment up to 2005, Germany saw its unem-
ployment drop in the later 2000s. Looking at 
benefits, at first glance neither unemployment 
benefits nor minimum income benefits changed 
much in this period. However, reforms between 
2003 and 2005 shifted large sections of the 
unemployed from more generous unemploy-
ment benefits to comparatively lower mini-
mum income benefits. The reforms also linked 
benefits more closely to active job-search 
efforts, which were increasingly strictly moni-
tored. At the same time, the reforms made it 
easier for employers to create atypical jobs; for 
instance, newly established firms could use 
fixed-term contracts for up to four years with-
out having to provide a valid reason, and 
employers could now create “mini-jobs,” that 
is, jobs with low hours, low wages, and no 
benefits. This period saw a steep increase in the 
Figure 5. Lagged Marginal Effects (up to five years) of Unemployment Benefits on 
Unemployment Rates across Configurations of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 3 (see Table 1) including lagged indicators 
of unemployment benefits up to five years (see Table A2 in the online supplement). Low EPL ratio, 
unionization, centralization = mean – standard deviation. High EPL ratio, unionization, centralization = 
mean + standard deviation.
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EPL ratio. The subsequent decrease in unem-
ployment is often described as a result of 
expansion in atypical employment. This devel-
opment is in line with this study’s findings: in 
the comparatively dualized German labor mar-
ket, benefit retrenchment was associated with 
lower unemployment as individuals were 
forced to take jobs they would perhaps have 
declined in another context.
Some countries, such as Ireland and Aus-
tria, became more similar to Germany in their 
institutional configuration in the later 2000s 
(mostly due to declining unionization), 
whereas others, like Slovakia, had combined 
an above-average EPL ratio, lower unioniza-
tion, and relatively high centralization for a 
longer time. In line with the models, unem-
ployment rose steeply in Slovakia until 2005 
and then decreased again when minimum 
income benefits were reduced.
The combination of above-average unioni-
zation and low centralization is rare. The United 
Kingdom fit this constellation in the early 
1990s, as did Italy and Slovenia in some years. 
Finland is the only country that was consist-
ently in this category. As the models suggest, a 
steady retrenchment of unemployment benefits 
and minimum income benefits throughout the 
1990s and 2000s accompanied a consistent 
decline in unemployment in Finland.
The Nordic countries—Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden—are well known for their com-
bination of high unionization and centraliza-
tion. This configuration was also present in 
Belgium, Austria, and Ireland until these 
countries became more similar to Germany in 
the later 2000s. All Nordic countries have cut 
back their very generous welfare states to 
some degree since the 1990s. Among them, 
Sweden is an interesting case because it not 
only cut benefits more substantially than did 
Denmark or Norway, but it also developed a 
more dualized labor market. Unionization has 
declined from above 85 percent in the 1990s 
Figure 6. Lagged Marginal Effects (up to five years) of Minimum Income Benefits on 
Unemployment Rates across Configurations of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 5 (see Table 1) including lagged indicators of 
minimum income benefits up to five years (see Table A3 in the online supplement). Low EPL ratio, 
unionization, centralization = mean – standard deviation. High EPL ratio, unionization, centralization = 
mean + standard deviation.
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to below 70 percent in the later 2000s. Most 
dramatically, as part of a reform package in 
2006 that significantly lowered unemploy-
ment benefits from 72.5 percent to 62 percent 
of former wages, wage bargaining was 
strongly decentralized and the use of fixed-
term contracts was made easier (resulting in a 
higher EPL ratio). After a severe economic 
crisis, Swedish unemployment levels consist-
ently decreased until the early 2000s, when 
they substantially rose again, which prompted 
the reforms. The changes were indeed accom-
panied by a subsequent decrease in unem-
ployment, possibly because lowering benefits 
works well in an increasingly dualized labor 
market with more atypical jobs. However, the 
results of this study suggest that Sweden has 
turned its back on a model that could have 
been equally successful in lowering unem-
ployment but without increasing labor market 
inequality.
Finally, the United States is the most obvi-
ous country that combines low levels of all 
three institutions that determine the insider/
outsider divide. Hence, we would expect 
increasing benefits to be associated with 
lower unemployment. Unemployment bene-
fits only changed from 58.5 to 54.5 percent in 
the observation period, but minimum income 
benefits dropped from around 22 percent to 
about 15 percent of average wages. U.S. 
unemployment rates dropped throughout the 
1990s, then briefly spiked in the early 2000s 
before quickly decreasing; they only rose 
again during the economic crisis. The model 
predictions are thus not completely borne out 
in the United States. This is probably because 
the models do not aim to fully predict unem-
ployment but to estimate the association 
between benefits and unemployment while 
adjusting for potential confounding factors. 
Because some important factors that influ-
ence trends in unemployment are not included 
in the models, and because the ceteris paribus 
conditions of the multivariate analysis are not 
met, it is possible for unemployment to 
increase although the specifications of the 
models would predict a decline. However, the 
implication is that increasing benefits would 
not have harmed the development of unem-
ployment in the United States. According to 
the models, the quick recovery in U.S. unem-
ployment after the crisis was aided rather than 
hindered by the temporary increase in the 
generosity of the Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation measure. The pattern observed 
in Switzerland, a country that also has low 
levels of regulation in respect to the three 
institutions, fits the predictions better. Unem-
ployment benefits did not change substan-
tially, but there was a steady decrease in 
minimum income benefits in relation to aver-
age wages. At the same time, unemployment 
increased from very low levels of between 2 
and 4 percent in the 1990s to up to 6 percent 
in the 2000s.
As a last step, examining the lagged effects 
in Figure 5, it becomes evident that the asso-
ciation between a change in unemployment 
benefits and unemployment tends toward zero 
in all regime types. In some cases they are not 
significantly different from zero after some 
years. Similarly, Figure 6 shows that the coef-
ficients for minimum income benefits decrease 
over time. Yet, they remain significantly dif-
ferent from zero except for the regime type 
with a high EPL ratio, high unionization, and 
low centralization. Because the associations 
tend to be strongest immediately after a 
change in benefits, and because there are both 
negative and positive associations, the find-
ings for the lagged models do not strongly 
support either the disincentive perspective or 
the job-search-subsidy perspective. In regime 
types with a high EPL ratio and either low 
unionization and high centralization or high 
unionization and low centralization, the posi-
tive association diminishes over time, which 
we could interpret as an initial disincentive 
effect that is outweighed by job-search-sub-
sidy effects in the long run. This seems a 
stretch, however, as the associations come 
closer to zero in all four regime types. Instead, 
the change over time might be due to institu-
tional changes that the models cannot take 
into account. For instance, there may be addi-
tional benefits reform after some years, thus 
biasing the results for all subsequent years. 
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Moreover, the time restrictions of the dataset 
cause the case numbers to go down with each 
added lag.
Weighing the evidence, the findings indi-
cate that the institutional context influences 
whether disincentive effects outweigh job-
search-subsidy effects or vice versa. The 
empirical evidence suggests that for job-
search subsidies to come into effect, the labor 
market needs to offer jobseekers attractive 
opportunities. When a large institutional 
insider/outsider divide reduces quality job 
opportunities, generous benefits are a disin-
centive to job search. There is no evidence 
that the strong job protection and high wages 
enjoyed by insiders serve as an added incen-
tive to look for these positions in countries 
with a strong insider/outsider divide, so that 
increased job-search efforts might ultimately 
make up for the lower job opportunities. In 
fact, only meager benefits force jobseekers to 
take job offers they would otherwise decline.
DIsCUssIOn
This study investigated the effect of welfare 
benefits on unemployment. The dominant 
disincentive perspective contends that gener-
ous benefits act as a disincentive to work and 
increase unemployment. By contrast, propo-
nents of the job-search-subsidy perspective 
argue that generous benefits lead to better job 
matches and lower unemployment levels. 
This article showed that the relationship 
depends on the institutional context. I demon-
strate that the disparity between EPL for per-
manent and temporary contract holders, and 
the configuration of the wage bargaining 
process in terms of unionization and central-
ization, determine the institutional insider/
outsider divide and thereby moderate how 
unemployment benefits and minimum income 
benefits affect unemployment. To test this 
proposition, the analysis combined data from 
20 European countries in the EULFS and 
from the United States CPS from 1992 to 
2009. I transformed the repeated cross- 
sectional data into pseudo-panels to use fixed 
effects at the level of sociodemographic 
groups. The empirical findings corroborate 
the main proposition of the article: the job-
search-subsidy function of generous benefits 
can indeed outweigh potential disincentives 
to work, lowering unemployment at the 
aggregate level. However, for job-search sub-
sidies to come into effect, the labor market 
needs to offer jobseekers attractive opportuni-
ties. The labor market’s capacity to provide 
this type of labor demand depends on the 
positional advantages labor market insiders 
receive from the institutional context. When a 
large institutional insider/outsider divide 
diminishes quality job opportunities, the dis-
incentive effects of generous benefits seem to 
prevail. Within such institutional contexts, 
meager benefits force jobseekers into employ-
ment, possibly accepting job offers they 
would otherwise decline.
The study makes three distinct contribu-
tions to the literature. First, it establishes the 
institutional insider/outsider divide as a mod-
erator of the relationship between benefits 
and unemployment. In a broader perspective, 
this supports scholarship that points out the 
existence of institutional interdependencies in 
national economies (e.g., Amable 2003; Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). Second, by 
testing the hypothesis with indicators for 
unemployment benefits and minimum income 
benefits, the analysis extends beyond prior 
work’s focus on unemployment insurance. I 
find very similar patterns for the relationship 
between both benefits and unemployment, 
which suggests their impact on job-search 
processes follows similar mechanisms. Third, 
by using pseudo-panels, the study illustrates a 
rarely used modeling technique. Comparative 
micro-level datasets are rarely in panel form, 
so applying this method in future studies and 
revisiting existing evidence might prove use-
ful for comparative research.
Two important matters could not be tack-
led within the scope of this study. First, the 
analysis relied on a binary distinction between 
employment and unemployment. Distinguish-
ing between different types of jobs might 
provide further insights on the effect of ben-
efits on labor markets (Kalleberg 2011). 
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Previous studies indicate that in labor markets 
with a large insider/outsider divide, jobseek-
ers are not only more likely to remain out of 
employment, they are also more likely to 
enter atypical jobs (Biegert 2014; Fervers and 
Schwander 2015; Schwander and Häuser-
mann 2013). On the other hand, in several 
countries, workers in low-wage jobs can 
receive welfare benefits. Hence, in certain 
contexts, benefits could subsidize low-wage 
jobs rather than providing job-search subsi-
dies.28 Future studies that explore how bene-
fits and labor market institutions relate to the 
quality of jobs could complement the present 
analysis. Second, although the findings sug-
gest that unemployment benefits and mini-
mum income benefits work via similar 
mechanisms, the emerging differences 
between the two warrant further study. This is 
especially relevant because the dualization 
literature argues that exclusive benefits, such 
as unemployment insurance, can themselves 
be an integral part of an insider/outsider labor 
market (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier and 
Thelen 2010).
The present study adds a crucial dimension 
to the existing research on the relationship 
between the welfare state and unemployment. 
It establishes that lower levels of the institu-
tional insider/outsider divide make it possible 
for generous welfare benefits to have a posi-
tive impact on unemployment. The results 
suggest that individuals are willing to work 
despite monetary incentives as long as there 
are attractive job opportunities. The findings 
have two important policy implications. First, 
they tie in with the claims of the flexicurity 
literature (see Kalleberg 2011; Viebrock and 
Clasen 2008; Wilthagen and Tros 2004). This 
literature highlights the beneficial interaction 
between a generous welfare state and a flexi-
ble labor market. Proponents argue that such 
institutional constellations enable high levels 
of employment security, especially when 
combined with ALMP. Similarly, Thelen 
(2014) describes an “embedded flexibiliza-
tion,” in which generous benefits are neces-
sary to create employment security and to 
collectivize the social risk of job loss in a 
liberalized labor market. The results of this 
study suggest that implementing such strate-
gies could help achieve low unemployment 
while also providing high levels of social 
security in times of joblessness.
Second, neither retrenching benefits nor 
deregulating labor markets are necessarily 
successful strategies to tackle unemployment. 
Instead, the study raises an additional ques-
tion, namely how to break down barriers 
between insiders and outsiders while retaining 
the benefits of institutions that improve the 
positions of insiders. For instance, we know 
that strong unions are crucial for better work-
ing conditions and low wage inequality (Brady 
et al. 2013; Freeman and Medoff 1984; West-
ern and Rosenfeld 2011). The results imply 
that the insider/outsider divide does not sim-
ply move along a spectrum between flexibility 
and regulation, but in some configurations 
coordination does not inhibit the positive 
effects of benefits for employment. The find-
ings point to constellations that combine high 
levels of economic security with better work-
ing conditions and high and equal wages, 
without excluding sections of the population 
from gainful employment.
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notes
 1.  In many countries, benefit levels are reduced 
after a certain amount of time. The job-search-
subsidy argument focuses on initial levels of ben-
efits for jobseekers, highlighting their effect on the 
job-search period immediately after job loss (e.g., 
Nelson and Stephens 2012). Long-term unemployed 
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individuals might be discouraged or not employable. 
Because this affects the intensity of their job search, 
job-search-subsidy effects are less likely.
 2.  There are different definitions of insiders and outsid-
ers in the literature. Early iterations of insider/outsider 
theory used a snapshot perspective on the labor force 
to define who is an insider and who is an outsider. The 
employed are considered insiders and the unemployed 
are considered outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower 
1988). Most of the dualization literature has modified 
this definition by including temporary workers in the 
group of outsiders (e.g., Rueda 2005). Thus, employed 
individuals can also be outsiders, but they have a 
higher propensity of future unemployment. Some con-
tributions to the dualization literature use a life-course 
perspective (e.g., Schwander and Häusermann 2013). 
Outsiders are understood as individuals who are more 
likely to experience unemployment and precarious 
work situations over their careers. According to this 
definition, unemployed individuals could be insiders 
if they only experience a short spell of unemployment 
between permanent jobs. The life-course definition is 
helpful, for instance, when investigating the policy 
preferences of insiders and outsiders. Here, I am inter-
ested in how benefits affect the unemployed, that is, 
individuals who are outsiders at this very moment, 
which is why the snapshot definition is more appro-
priate. More importantly, differences between the 
snapshot definition and the life-course definition do 
not directly affect the core of the proposed theoretical 
argument, because it is not about complete congruence 
between the unemployed and outsiders but about how 
benefits affect jobseekers’ search process and how the 
insider/outsider divide affects the availability of attrac-
tive jobs for jobseekers.
 3.  Iversen (1998) convincingly argues that the rela-
tionship between unions, the wage bargaining 
system, and economic outcomes such as unemploy-
ment depends on the given monetary policy regime. 
To test whether monetary policy affects the rela-
tionships proposed here, I ran a robustness check 
adjusting for central bank independence (see Table 
B7 and Figure B2 [“Incl. Central Bank Indep.”] in 
the online supplement). Inclusion of this indicator 
does not yield substantively different results.
 4.  Depending on the macro-economic context, benefi-
cial outcomes for insiders could include alternatives 
to wage increases such as higher job security. Either 
way, these bargaining outcomes will decrease qual-
ity job opportunities for jobseekers.
 5.  The code for the dataset and analyses is available on 
the author’s webpage.
 6.  As a robustness check, I conducted the analysis 
using random-effects models, which use between 
variation as well. The results do not substantively 
differ (see Table B12 and Figure B3 [“Random 
Effects Models”] in the online supplement).
 7.  Clustering standard errors at the country or coun-
try-year level, the main findings remain unchanged, 
albeit modestly less significant. In another robust-
ness check (available from the author), I ran the 
models using a multilevel specification that also 
confirmed the findings (for a similar approach, see 
Jæger 2013).
 8.  Rather than modeling national unemployment 
more accurately, group-level unemployment rates 
approximate individual-level unemployment. In the 
absence of real individual panel data, this is a pref-
erable way of modeling the proposed macro-micro 
mechanisms. When I aggregate the unemployment 
rates of the various sociodemographic groups at the 
country-year level, they are still highly correlated 
(.89) with the official numbers from the OECD, 
which confirms the validity of the data used here.
 9.  I also use the data structure to run a robustness 
check on the subsample of low-educated individu-
als to see whether disincentive effects are stronger 
among individuals with lower wage expectations 
(see Table B8 and Figure B2 [“Low-Educated Sam-
ple”] in the online supplement).
10.  Because of the restriction to working-age (15 to 
64) individuals, 1928 is the first year an individual 
could be born and still enter the sample in 1992. 
1994 is the last year an individual could be born and 
enter the sample before the end of 2009.
11.  I selected the countries according to the availabil-
ity of micro data and macro indicators. These are 
the countries in alphabetical order: Austria, Bel-
gium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Data collection for France starts 
in 1993; for Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995; 
for the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland in 
1996; for Hungary in 1997; for Slovakia in 1998; 
for Estonia in 2003; and for Slovenia in 2004. Data 
from 1998 are dropped for Ireland and the United 
Kingdom due to missing information on education.
12.  I ran robustness checks in which I coded only respon-
dents who worked at least 35 hours a week or more 
as being employed. This alternative model reveals 
some differences from the main analysis, which I 
discuss in the online supplement (see also Table B9 
and Figure B2 [“<35 Hours + Unemployed”]).
13.  The definition of the dependent variable excludes 
jobless individuals who are not actively seeking a 
job, that is, the inactive. Robustness checks using the 
nonemployment rate and the inactivity rate as depen-
dent variables yield results that, in line with the theo-
retical expectations, imply that inactive individuals 
are less affected by benefits and labor market institu-
tions than are the unemployed (see Tables B10 and 
B11, Figure B3 [“Inactive” and “Nonemployed”], 
and the discussion in the online supplement).
14.  To increase case numbers, we could think of any 
number of further time-constant determinants of 
cohort membership or use a more fine-grained 
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grouping of birth cohorts. Some possibilities, such 
as race or place of birth, are not available for the 
full sample. More importantly, this would reduce 
robustness in the measurement of aggregated time-
varying cohort-level variables, such as the unem-
ployment rate.
15.  Because some countries consistently have larger 
case numbers than others, this procedure might 
increase their weight in the analysis and thus bias 
the results. I ran the models without the weights and 
did not find meaningful differences (see Table B13 
and Figure B3 [“Without Weights”] in the online 
supplement).
16.  Other components of unemployment benefits might 
affect their overall generosity, such as benefit dura-
tion, eligibility criteria, and coverage. I ran robust-
ness checks with an indicator that comprehensively 
included these components but was not available 
for the full set of countries (Scruggs, Jahn, and 
Kuitto 2014). I found some differences, which I 
discuss in the online supplement (see Table B1 and 
Figure B1 [“Unemp. Benefit Generosity”]).
17.  I ran robustness checks using the indicator for EPL 
for permanent contracts instead of the ratio and con-
trolling for EPL for temporary contracts. The differ-
ences in the results indicate that the disparity in EPL 
for permanent contracts and temporary contracts is 
more important for the insider/outsider divide and 
the effect of benefits on unemployment than the 
overall level of EPL (see Table B6 and Figure B2 
[“EPL Permanent Contracts”] in the online supple-
ment).
18.  Centralization is a concept closely related to cor-
poratism (although the two are not interchangeable, 
see Calmfors and Driffill 1988). I ran robustness 
checks using an indicator for corporatism instead of 
centralization (Jahn 2014). I found only minor dif-
ferences, which I discuss in the online supplement 
(see Table B5 and Figure B1 [“Corporatism”]).
19.  There are gaps in the time series for coverage. In 
order not to lose observations, I interpolate values 
linearly.
20.  Coverage might moderate unionization effects in 
a similar way to centralization. Furthermore, some 
countries known for their strong insider/outsider 
divides, such as France, Portugal, and Spain, show 
high coverage although centralization is rather low. 
I ran robustness checks including interactions with 
coverage instead of centralization and found slight 
differences, which I discuss in the online supple-
ment (see Table B4 and Figure B1 [“Coverage”]).
21.  Another potentially relevant confounder is the orga-
nization of unemployment benefits in a Ghent sys-
tem, where unions administer the benefits. I ran a 
robustness check excluding the four Ghent countries 
(Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Sweden); it did not 
yield substantively different results (see Table B3 
and Figure B1 [“Without Ghent Countries”] in the 
online supplement).
22.  The figures use the overall difference in the indica-
tors between two time points: 1992 and 2009. Thus, 
the figures do not show the substantial variance 
in the years between these two time points within 
countries (see Table A1 in the online supplement).
23.  In 2009, the unemployment rate in many countries 
was already affected by the global economic crisis. 
Using other time frames produces different change 
rates. However, the overall pattern for the bivariate 
relationships between benefits and unemployment 
rates is robust.
24.  Judging from the figures, there might be single 
countries strongly driving the association between 
changes in benefits and changes in unemployment. 
I ran the models for unemployment benefits with-
out Italy and Sweden and the models for minimum 
income benefits without the Czech Republic, Italy, 
and Sweden (see Table B2 and Figure B1 [“With-
out Potential Outliers”] in the online supplement). 
Excluding these potential outliers did not substan-
tively change the main findings.
25.  The coefficient became insignificant and dramati-
cally diminished in size when I ran the models 
without wave dummies. This might hint at potential 
shortcomings in previous studies, as many did not 
adjust for global trends (Belot and van Ours [2004] 
being an exception).
26.  The lagged independent variable models deal with 
two more concerns. First, politicians might increase 
welfare benefits to appease a growing population of 
unemployed people. Hence, there might be reverse 
causality. Second, because measurement on the micro 
level is spread over the whole year, information on 
individuals’ labor market status might stem from 
a time point before policy changes took place. The 
order of events might thus be corrupted in some cases.
27.  Additional analyses investigating potential outliers 
indicate that this prediction changes and becomes 
more similar to the predictions for unemploy-
ment benefits when excluding Sweden, Italy, and 
the Czech Republic (see Table B2 and Figure B1 
[“Without Potential Outliers”] in the online supple-
ment).
28.  See the discussion of robustness checks using an 
alternative dependent variable that only codes indi-
viduals with at least 35 work hours as employed 
(Table B9 and Figure B2 [“<35 Hours + Unempl.”] 
in the online supplement).
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